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WHO IS
THE REAL ENEMY
OF
GERMANY?

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN

BY

FR. L. WEINMANN.

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INTRODUCTION.

THE success with which the Prussian expedition against Austria, in 1866, has been crowned, and the subsequent impunity of the unheard of spoliation committed, by the Chief of the House of Hohenzollern, upon sovereign German Princes, his near relatives and faithful allies, has, as is often the case in this world, where actions are generally measured by the standard of success, induced the general opinion of Europe to pass a milder judgment upon the policy of Bismarck and his King than would otherwise have been the case. In Germany especially, but chiefly in the northern parts of it, the rallying cry of German Unity, raised by the wily Minister and his pliant tools, took the desired effect, and made the easily swayed multitude look upon a stern and despotic King, who could by no means boast of the love of his people, as a sort of hero, who would regenerate the

fatherland, and with whose reign a new Era would begin for United Germany; whilst the most unpopular and hated Minister, whom, like Dionisius of Syracus, patriots considered it a virtue to extirpate, became, as with a turn of the enchanted wand, the most popular man throughout the land,—a second Brutus who, for the love of his country, had dissimulated his real character for years. The masses, however, were always easily imposed upon by appearances; history shows it, in its fullest extent. Oppression and tyranny were invariably forgiven to the conquering hero by his subjects, and even posterity often looks with an admiring eye upon such men, as Napoleon I., the Czar Peter, Frederick II. of Prussia, Charles XII. of Sweden, and others.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, when hero worship has been given up, when even in bigotted Spain the Saints have been taken out of their niches and placed in a heap in a corner, and political and religious liberty begin to spread their beneficial wings over the country, it is time for the peoples of Europe closer to scrutinize the acts and proceedings of their Governments and to judge them by a different standard as heretofore, viz: the interest of the reigning families and their followers,

Thousands of German lives have been sacrificed in the late war between Prussia and Austria, and what was the object? what the cause and the effect? According to Count Bismarck, the object of it was German Unity. What mockery! The object of the war was the aggrandizement of Prussia. The cause of the war was, according to that truth-loving minister, Austrian arrogance. Poor Austria, beaten by France, threatened by Italy, bullied by Prussia, where could her arrogance come from?

Now let us come to the effect or result of the war, which was undertaken by Prussia for the sake of German Unity. The victor invariably dictates the law; the chief article of the treaty of Prague, dictated by Prussia, is the exclusion of Austria for ever from Germany. Let us well note this fact:—Thirteen million Germans are for ever excluded from Germany by the dictates of Prussia. This is certainly a curious way to begin the unification of Germany by excluding one fourth part of its inhabitants from the fatherland, by forbidding them from calling themselves Germans. It is clear from this, that the result for Germany, as a whole, was the loss of one fourth of the country. Nor was there the slightest gain for any of the integral parts of Germany. Neither the Kingdom of Bavaria, nor the

Kingdoms of Würtemberg or Saxony, or any of the smaller States, have gained anything by it; on the contrary, they have lost by the Treaties of August, 1866, part of their rights as sovereign and independent States, whilst Hanover, Electoral Hesse, &c., &c., have entirely lost their independence. Who then gained by the war? Nobody but Prussia; by Prussia is here meant not the Prussian people, who have only gained an augmentation of taxes, a deficit in the budget, a further restriction of the freedom of the press, and of personal liberties. By Prussia is meant only the dynasty of the Hohenzollerns and their followers; just as Count Bismark means by German Unity, the subjugation of the best part of Germany by Prussia.

The danger threatens not only Germany alone, but the whole of civilized Europe. The House of Hohenzollern stands not alone with its projects of aggrandizement and dominion; there is another reigning family, (equally unscrupulous and even more powerful, always ready to seize an occasion of extending its dominions, and willing to assist Prussia in her nefarious projects,) which has but lately ordered an increase of its army of the small amount of 240,000 men in times of peace. The Hohenzollern and Romanow Houses are an ever threatening danger to the peace and civilization of Europe. To unmask part of

the designs of the Hohenzollern dynasty, to show that they are the real enemies of Germany and of European tranquility, the following pages have been written and translated from the German for the English public. Military and despotic Monarchies governed by daring and unscrupulous men have been and may again become scourges of the world, and when ruling over warlike races, the words of the poet may again become true, when he said:—

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WHO IS THE REAL ENEMY OF GERMANY?

EARLY in the year 1868 there was a general foreboding that great events would take place ere the expiration of the next twelve months. Heavy thunderclouds were hovering on three sides of the political horizon. They were known as the Oriental, the Italian, and the German questions,—questions deservedly called so, in as much as it is admitted on all sides that the present state of affairs in Germany, Italy, and the East, cannot thus continue. Neither can it be changed without very materially affecting many various, and often seemingly distant interests. It is most likely that, wherever the fire breaks out, the conflagration will not remain local, but on the contrary, the blaze when bursting forth in one place will soon spread its devastating influence over the two other regions, which are by no means wanting in combustible matter. There is much reason for fearing that these coming events may extend throughout the whole of Europe.

It would be a very difficult matter indeed to assign now, with any degree of accuracy, the position which the European powers would take up, should this, in our opinion inevitable, conflagration come to pass.

All depends upon the ways and means by which the crisis will be brought about. Still there can be no doubt concerning two of the chief actors in the coming drama, so far as regards their relative positions from the very beginning. France and Prussia will face each other as adversaries.

There arises a question which closely concerns not only the still surviving powers of the former German Bund, but every individual German Citizen, viz., to which of the two parties he will ally himself. This is a question not of mere sympathy with or antipathy against either side, but one which will eventually necessitate both acts and deeds.

The Germans of the present generation have from their youth been constantly reminded of the events which took place during the years 1813-15. They have been taught to glory in the deeds of their fathers at that memorable time and to commemorate them in their songs. No one can gainsay their right to do so.

They have not always however been strictly impartial, they have been too much inclined to omit looking at the other side of the question, for whilst patriotism is in itself very praiseworthy, there has too frequently been a dangerous and blameable tendency towards unjustly hating France and the French nation. This injustice originated from the supposition that the temporary state in which France was placed at the time (in consequence of the revolution) was her characteristic and permanent condition, and from the idea that, France intending to conquer Germany, therefore Germany could only see in France her natural and hereditary enemy. Herein was the danger of being prejudiced on one side; there was however a

danger on the other side, namely that of the over-glorification of the Prussian State. It was the policy of the Hohenzollern Monarchy to have these two prejudices extended and interwoven. This has been brought about with remarkable success. The organs of that power have, with astonishing ability, enlisted during the last half century almost the whole literature of Germany into the service of the Prussian policy, a task which was considerably facilitated to them by the carelessness of the Austrian and other German Governments. This literature created a tradition which, while praising the the Prussian power far beyond desert or measure, was neither just to France, nor impartial towards the other German States.

All, who are acquainted with the history of these days, can have no doubt that the glory of persevering in combating with foreign oppression, is not due to that section of the Germans, who lived under the sceptre of the Hohenzollerns, but chiefly to the lower Saxons and the Tyrolese. Yet, although this is so apparent, there are, nevertheless, very few German historical books, which present this subject truthfully, and in its proper light. The consequence, therefore, of this tradition as it exists at the present time, and which must essentially be termed an artificial one, is prejudice *against France*, and prejudice *in favour of Prussia*, to the disadvantage of other German States and Nations. If Germany were still in existence, there would, notwithstanding these prejudices, be no choice for any patriotic German, in the event of a conflict between France and the Hohenzollern State, the latter being a member of the United German Bund. But in a political sense Germany is

existent no longer;—like Poland, it is now, only a geographical term.

The fatherland is broken up, partitioned through the injustice and violence of the Hohenzollern dynasty, a dynasty of fraud and force. We Germans have certainly no great reasons for praising the former German Bund. The words which were at the time of its establishment in 1815, pronounced with emphasis by the Prince Regent, afterwards King George IV. of Hanover, have indeed proved true, regarding this institution, from its beginning to its end, namely: that this form of Union was not suitable to the wants of the German nation, that he only consented to it in the hope of a future remodelling, and because for the present, no better could be obtained.

Still, this German Bund, with all the glaring defects in its Constitution, has preserved the characteristics of the German nationality. Its system of defence towards foreign countries was a bulwark, not only for the Germans, but also for the peoples of Europe, against a war of conquest; and its system of Federation in the interior, disproportionate as it was, when first making its appearance, still embraced the idea of equal rights for all German tribes, of an emulating development, according to their respective types. The fact is evident that the Germans, during the fifty years continuance of the Bund, have not been outstripped, in the development of their moral faculties, and material progress in all directions, by any nation; but on the contrary, taking into the consideration, the point of departure, they have surpassed most of them. Let this be admitted.

We acknowledge the defects of the institution, and constitution of the Bund; but even with all its imperfections, the German Bund could have done real service, and effected much good, had not the policy of the Hohenzollerns always barred the way. That policy did not wish to consolidate the Federation; but to weaken it as a preparatory step towards breaking it up entirely and annexing its single members. Meanwhile, the literature in its service, either knowingly subservient to its views and wishes, or unknowingly, by mere force of example and habit, kept invariably pointing westward as the quarter from whence the Arch-enemy was to come, thus preparing the means for those terribly severe blows, which, according to Prussian opinion, were to put an end to the federatively united German nation; in order to build and erect from its ruins, under the fictitious name of German Unity, the conquering military dominion of the Hohenzollern family.

We do not intend or wish to specially criticise the acts of this or that person, neither the King, nor the Minister, who at the present time exercises his power. Still less do we desire to abuse those Germans, who willingly, or unwillingly, have had the misfortune to be devoted life and soul to the service of a principle, which is incompatible with the peace of nations, and which has created such a dynasty as that of the Hohenzollern. Our criticism is not personal, it is only directed towards the principle itself, which we can confidently and positively aver is the real Arch-enemy of German nationality.

But it may be remarked: "Have we not known all this before? Was it only in the year 1866 that one's eyes

were opened to the fact? Were not the history of the origin and the growth of that power of a sufficiently premonitory character to proclaim aloud to all what we had to expect?"

The State of the Hohenzollerns has not, as other powers have, for instance France, England, Sweden, and Denmark, a determined basis by geographical position, or owing to the nationality of the inhabitants. This Kingdom has arisen through the political activity of the Hohenzollern Family in annexing lands inhabited by German and Slavonic populations. In this respect the countries of Austria and Prussia have both a point of resemblance. The power of Austria also owes its growth to its dynasty. The House of Hapsburg has likewise gathered together nations, countries, and peoples, and so formed a political whole or body. The means, however, which have been employed to effect this, were widely different in the two cases. The principle of the policy of the House of Hapsburg is, in spite of its many aberrations, the preservation and upholding of treaties concluded. The reason of this is obvious, since it is upon the strength of these treaties that the greater part of the Austrian lands have been obtained. Thus they have passed to the female line of the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine. The type has remained the same.

The beginning of the Prussian State was felony and sacrilege. This beginning has once and for ever traced out, as its future line of conduct, the unceasing employment of unscrupulous efforts for aggrandizement. These efforts are in direct contradiction to those qualities which the Germans are in the habit of considering as national, namely:—honesty and straight-

forwardness. It did not require the enunciation of a Prussian Minister of that principle of the Hohenzollern dynasty that "*might is above right*," or that, whenever the aggrandizement of the Prussian State is the object, no moral law is considered as binding. Facts prove that the Hohenzollern dynasty,—although they may not always have had the audacity openly to assert this theory, but tried to excuse their doings on the plea of necessity, or to represent them as a quiet submission to the will of God, or to the decrees of fate,—has invariably followed these principles whenever there was an opportunity for the aggrandizement of their State.

Connected with every single acquisition of that dynasty are a series of offences of so serious a nature as to be fitly termed crimes; these are not only contrary to the divine laws implanted in every man's heart, but also against the actual laws which nations have agreed between themselves to regard as binding, and even the breaking of the given word was considered no violation by them.

Such an insatiable desire for growth and aggrandizement was necessarily of an aggressive character. The aggression was at first directed against Germany and Poland. In both these countries the policy of the dynasty of the Hohenzollerns attempted to prevent the establishment of a well-organized constitutional life, and to break the ties which held them together, using subtle as well as violent means for that purpose. The object in view was, to make these countries, by their dissolution, suitable for serving as materials for annexation, and also, according to circumstances, to swallow up as much of them as the fear of the other powers would allow. That

this fear is the only obstacle which in any degree stops the voracious desires of the Hohenzollern dynasty, has been openly acknowledged by Count Bismark, in the so-called Diet of the North-German Bund, on the occasion of the Luxemburg complication.* But even without this oral declaration, there are the facts of the division of Poland and others which speak for themselves.

In the year 1740 begins the Hohenzollern offensive movement with the view of crushing the existing German Constitution, and of appropriating several of its component parts. From that time till the outbreak of the French revolution the fearful wars in Germany were the work of the Hohenzollern dynasty. The war in 1756 had the same aim as that which took place in 1866. There was only this great difference, that the battle of Kolin, the gain of which would have had the same or similar results for the Hohenzollerns as the victory at Königgrätz in 1866, turned against the aggressors and forced them to assume a defensive position.

It has often been adduced in favour of the Hohenzollern dynasty, that they and their people have at that time also fought against the common enemy of Western Europe, namely against the half-civilized power of Russia. This is to some extent true; but this passing enmity was not at all owing to principles, but only to the personal dislike of an angry woman, the Czarina, Elizabeth. Immediately after her death, the great similarity of their principles brought the two powers once more into close connexion.

* Stenographic Reports, page 489.

Since then that alliance may have been at times more or less firm and evident; in its essence, however, it is, in the present state of affairs in Europe, indissoluble.

The common object, and therefore the cement (Kitt) of that alliance was then the Kingdom of Poland, this bulwark of Western Europe and chiefly of Germany towards the East. The Hohenzollern dynasty performed the services of a common handmaid for the destruction of this bulwark, in order to receive, as recompense, such part of the booty as Russia condescended to grant to them.

Austria, unsupported by France, could not resist alone, and was therefore absolutely compelled to take part in that shameful robbery. But the Empress, Maria Theresa, never ceased to regret that act of spoliation, in which she had been forced to participate against her own will. In later times she, in the most earnest manner, impressed upon the mind of her daughter, the Queen of France, in consideration of her own experiences and in painful presentiment of the great misfortunes of future days, with serious warnings and admonitions the necessity of a faithful alliance and friendship between France and Austria. The characteristic words of Maria Theresa, written ninety years ago, are as true to day as they were at that time: *—"Every one in Europe," says the Empress, "knows what reliance can be placed upon the King of Prussia and his word. France has experienced it on many occasions, and scarcely a single Prince in Europe has escaped his perfidies. And such a King wants to become dictator and

* *Letters of Maria Theresa and Maria Antoinette*, edited by Arneth, page 204, and following.

protector of Germany! *Yet, what is still more remarkable, is that all powers do not join together to prevent such a misfortune, which sooner or later must rebound upon all!* Since thirty-seven years has this man been, by his Military Monarchy and his violent acts, the scourge of Europe. He has renounced all recognised principles of right and truth; he looks upon all treaties and alliances with scorn. We are of them all the most exposed to his machinations," (and in these words lies a painful reproach to France) "we are abandoned! We shall, it is to be hoped, yet extricate ourselves this time, be it without or with losses."

Then again, turning her thought to the future, the Empress perceives that the State created by Frederick II. will, in all essential points, always follow the same policy of its originator, and that this very State of the Hohenzollerns will be the source of infinite misery, not only for Germany, but for the whole of Europe. She thus continues:—

"But I do not plead for Austria. What I say concerns all the powers of Europe. Futurity does not lie smiling before me. I shall not live to see it; but my children and grand-children, our sacred religion and my good people will experience it but too painfully. We already now feel the powerful despotism of that Military Monarchy so utterly devoid of all principle, which acknowledges no other rule of action save that for its own advantage. If this Prussian principle is allowed to take still deeper root, what have they to expect who will one day come after us? For this system is—let no one be mistaken upon this point—continually growing and extending."

When Maria Theresia, in the year 1778, characterised the principle of the Hohenzollern State in such words, the latter commanded the lives and the means of only five and a half million of men. And now?—

At that time the Prussian policy tried to gain over France, which had so foolishly assisted and rendered important services in the conquest of Silesia,—services which required considerable sacrifices on her own part. Maria Theresia therefore put forth the warning:—

“Let no one be misled by the flatteries of the Prussian policy. The King flatters in order to gain his own ends, but when they are once obtained he acts just in a contrary sense and never keeps his word. He thus acts against all except the one power which he fears. This is Russia. She acts,” says the Empress, “according to the same political principles as Prussia, and consequently mutual interest binds those powers always together in a close alliance, even if that alliance is not expressed in words. *They keep together, because they have the same tendency for aggrandizement, but not the same objects in view. I therefore consider Russia and Prussia as one and the same power.*”

The conviction of the necessity of keeping Austria and France united by a firm bond of alliance against that destructive and conquering principle of the Russo-Prussian power, became every day more strongly rooted in the mind of the Empress, even up to the time of her death. The words of this great and mighty Queen are in this respect also of great weight:—“This is no longer a question with regard to the old prejudices which ought to have been buried in oblivion

long ago, namely, the jealousy between France and Austria: All that is most sacred to us, and our own interests are at stake. *We shall be overrun and knocked to the ground the one after the other, if we do not oppose a firm alliance.*"

We repeat, that the words of the Empress, Maria Theresa, of the year 1778 had lost nothing of their truth and clearness in the year 1866. The means employed in the interior, through which the dynasty of the Hohenzollerns chiefly succeeded in their policy abroad, were also strictly and distinctly predicted by those words of the Empress, Maria Theresa. It was the unconscientious and regardless sacrifice of the blood and money of their subjects. It was the State of the Hohenzollerns that first inaugurated the fearful example of that system from which the whole of Europe now suffers:—the system of sucking out and consuming the forces of national life, in order to have a disproportionately large standing army always ready for commencing an aggressive war.

King Frederick II., although only ruler over five million of men, was enabled to keep himself on an equality with the great powers by forcing these five millions to maintain in times of peace an army of 180,000 soldiers:—that is one man in 27.

What an enormous and endless source of misery lies in this simple and plain proportions of the two numbers *one* and 27! A military burden in times of peace such as this, is not known in the history of humanity neither of old nor in our more modern times,—it is without parallel. By this system King Frederick II., as the representative of the Hohenzollern dynasty, became the originator of the system

of "armed peace," that curse of his own people, and indirectly also of all the peoples in Europe.

Has the Hohenzollern dynasty ever employed this enormous military power, squeezed out of the blood and the sweat of its unfortunate people, for the protection of Germany? Perhaps in the wars of the French revolution?

The French contemporaries most emphatically assert, that the conduct of the Prussian Government, and especially the bragging Manifesto of 1792, was one of the chief levers used by the Jacobins, to force the offended national pride into the unhappy paths of these days; whilst afterwards, when the revolution was foaming and boiling over, the Prussian Government neglected to do its part of the duty to prevent an exploding discharge over the frontier.

They kept aloof, in order to allow the work of the destruction of the German Constitution, which had been already commenced by them, to be achieved by the Jacobins, and further to obtain from the same Jacobins, by abandoning to them the left shore of the Rhine as a recompence, the reversion of the possessions of the German neighbours. And that not only of the clerical Princes alone.

At the time of the treaty of peace of Basil in 1795, the secret articles already betrayed the craving of the Hohenzollerns after the possession of Hanover, which during a period of eleven years formed the chief point which determined their policy towards the Western Powers.

The State of the Hohenzollern has never once drawn the sword for Germany. Whatever may have been the sentiments of those Germans who served under their standard: the policy

of that House was in the year 1814 as well as afterwards decided solely towards carrying on a war of conquest for its own selfish interest with the assistance of Russia.

The natural and just wishes of the German nation were not realized at the Congress of Vienna.

The German Confederation was formed nevertheless, and the Hohenzollern dynasty joined it. This was done, as all subsequent acts have shown, not in order to advance the German federative principle, but to thwart its developement, and at the first occasion to rend asunder, in a similar way as formerly the Empire, the Confederation, and to turn the German countries into materials for annexation for themselves.

The real position of the Powers had, unfortunately, become obscured. First, by their ephemeral relation from 1813 to 1815; then, by the creation of the so-called Holy Alliance, a compact which was entirely untrue and unnatural in its object and essence, and lastly, by the necessity of the State of the Hohenzollerns, to assimilate the newly acquired provinces to its own principles.

Thus, it came to pass, that Germany, France, and the whole of Europe, during the long peace of fifty years, almost forgot upon what principles that State of the Hohenzollerns was based. They forgot the point of view, according to which the Empress, Maria Theresia, addressed such seriously warning words to the Queen of France. These words ought to form for Austria as well as for France, for each of the German Governments and the neighbouring countries, the starting point from which their political views and considerations should be drawn.

There are volcanos which repose during scores of years, nay, even during centuries. The injury sustained by our forefathers becomes less vivid in the recollection of succeeding generations. They build their peaceful cottages upon the cooled down lava trusting that the fires of the earth have become extinguished. The summit of the mountain glitters from the light falling upon the snow and ice, which, from having lain there scores of years, is considered eternal, and yet these forces work uneasily and the mountains only slumber.

A similar anxiety might have presented itself from time to time in the mind of the Empress, Maria Theresa, when she gave utterance to the words of 1778. But people consoled themselves with the idea that one half of the military power of the Hohenzollern State, that is the Landwehr, (militia), was incapable of being employed in an aggressive war or a war of conquest.

That idea was so deeply rooted, that in the minds of the people it was not even abandoned, when that man, in whom in our times, the principle of the Hohenzollerns was concentrated in a like manner as that of a century ago in King Frederick II., declared before the whole world, that his system would be one of "*Blood and Iron.*" Nor was that idea relinquished when at the same time the reorganisation of the Prussian army tended to the clearly preceptible aim of transforming the Landwehr into an army of aggression.

It is true, Prussian policy has at the same time not neglected to employ those other means, which Maria Theresa pointed out in her words of 1778 as one of its characteristics; namely, to make use of untruths in every shape and form.

In the year 1860, King William was heard to address in Baden-Baden the Princes there assembled in terms which were becoming to a straightforward, honest, and well-intentioned man.

He pledged his kingly word not to break up the Bund, nor to menace the rights of the other Princes, but to guard and protect them.

At the same time, and even afterwards, the chief organ of the Hohenzollern policy, the Berlin *Kreuz-Zeitung*, discussed and reprobated during a number of years the passing events in Italy in a long series of articles, which, rhetorically considered, may be taken as forming a standard of a true policy of right and honour.

The number of those persons was as yet very small indeed, who at that time, having a thorough knowledge of the Hohenzollern dynasty and policy, declared their sincere conviction, that these words were but vain lies and sham, and that the policy of the Hohenzollern State at a given occasion would do the very same thing which they represented in the case of Italy as so very damnable.

The year 1866 produced this crisis. The policy of the Hohenzollern dynasty—for it was only to this that any attention was paid, and not to the will of the people under its sway—showed itself in its full light, exactly as ninety years before the Empress, Maria Theresia, had predicted it, as an active and vigorous military despotism caring neither for right, truth, nor honour, utterly regardless of everything, save the furtherance of its own selfish interests, only with this difference, that in place of its former cynicism

in religious matters there was now substituted—it is difficult to say which is the more despicable—dissimulating hypocrisy. The difference, however, is merely of a personal nature. It does not alter the features of the case. The facts are patent before our eyes.

But there is another danger which has arisen from the rapid and great success of that policy.

This danger lies in the inclination which many Germans have, to accept the apparently accomplished fact of the victory of the Prussian system of force.

We say *apparently* accomplished fact. The victory of Königgrätz, as well as the treaty of peace of Prague, are undoubtedly accomplished facts, but not on that account a final triumph of the Prussian violence in general. The former facts do not form the basis of a durable state of things; for they are irreconcilable with all the political views till now common in Europe. They challenge contradiction from the latter. They are not the last acts of the terrible drama, which the insatiable appetite of the Hohenzollern dynasty, for swallowing up the countries, has brought about in Europe, but they are the prelude of others that will follow. This mistake of confounding the one with the other is often made in Germany; we are desirous to prevent its spreading further.

We do not address those who already before the Catastrophe of 1866 professed to believe in the fiction, that the Hohenzollern State represented a national German principle, as it is useless to attempt to reason with those who knowingly profess an untruth. But we address those who, by reviewing the present state of affairs, endeavour to effect the

result, that Prussia should be absorbed and transformed by Germany. They say that the state of affairs at the present is only a period of transition, and that from it will come forth a united and free Germany.

It is the better part of the so-called National-Liberals who thus think and hope. With that hope they consent to join the wish, that the violent annexation of the countries of Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Electoral-Hesse, Nassau, and Frankfort, may be a permanent one, and also join in the notoriously false assertion that the Hohenzollern State with the so-called North-German Confederation represent Germany. They even themselves try to co-operate, in order that those parts of the former German fatherland, which do not appertain to that North-German Confederation, may also join it; the object being to strengthen the German element so as to form not only an equipoise to the Prussian, but also to make the German element predominant over the Prussian.

The intentions of that party are often of a well-meaning character. Its followers are to be met with, not only in the countries belonging to the Hohenzollern State, and in those forming the so-called Northern Bund, but also in the South-Western States, and even, but with less frequency, in Austria.

Let us therefore examine the foundation upon which that party build, not so much their hopes, but rather their aims and desires.

The first and most important, nay, even the decisive task of that party, would consist in strongly opposing and entirely abolishing the really constitutive element of the Hohenzollern State, viz: its military absolutism.

This military absolutism is not inherent to the soil upon which the Hohenzollern State was at first erected. It has been forced upon the inhabitants in contempt of all rights, by the energy of the Hohenzollern dynasty.

In the year 1628 the Estates of the Margraviate Brandenburg, still possessed the right as well as the power to refuse to supply the means for the support of a standing army of even less than one thousand men. The third generation afterwards supported in times of peace a Brandenburg-Prussian army of *eighty thousand men*, without having either the right or the power to refuse the means for its support.

With that army, King Frederick II., invaded the Austrian territory against all justice and honour. He was victorious. But over whom? He was victorious not only over Austria; and by inaugurating in his State, the system of military despotism with a baptism of blood, he conquered at the same time and put on one side every legitimate claim and pretension of his own resisting people to right and liberty.

They may have been honest people as well, who, at the time, hoped, that by the addition of fresh members to the State of the Hohenzollerns, the terrible military system would become modified in its character, but, unhappily, they also were in error. King Frederick II., inherited from his father, the dominion over $2\frac{1}{2}$ million of people, who in times of peace supported *eighty thousand soldiers*. He left to his successor the dominion over $5\frac{1}{2}$ millions, who were compelled to support in times of peace, the still greater number of *one hundred and eighty thousand armed men*.

In other words:—The dynasty of the Hohenzollerns has

forced upon their original subjects, a military despotism. The addition of fresh subjects has not produced the desired effect, it has not weakened nor moderated that system. On the contrary, the fresh subjects are compelled to submit to it, and thereby to strengthen and extend it. The consequence of this system for all the other relations of political life in the State of that dynasty, is a sharply defined absolutism in its most pregnant form from above, with corresponding servility from below. On that account, *Lessing* called this Prussia, which he so well knew, the most slavish land in Europe. For the same reason the English Ambassador at the time in Berlin, felt as if he were in the frosty atmosphere of a prison, and saluted the Polish frontier (it was before the partition of Poland) as he would have the first dawn of spring after a tedious and hard winter.

This absolute military Monarchy presented a less arbitrary aspect, after the year 1815. The spirit of the time was different from that crude brutality of the past century. The stern forms had become still more modified through the circumstance that the newly acquired countries, (by means of the Russian alliance), had first to be assimilated. And again at that time there were many Germans who hoped that the acquisition of Saxony, of so many parts of Westphalia, and of the Rhenish provinces, would prove beneficial, and of a salutary effect upon Prussian politics, in regard to the general interests of Germany.

It was a mistaken notion. The spirit which animated the dynasty never changed; whether it ruled with or without a Constitution; whether that Constitution had been sworn to,

by oath, to be upheld or not; whether, or not, from the walls of the Diets resounded empty phrases of the debates of the deputies, the dynastic spirit remained the same.

Whenever the occasion seemed favourable, a war of conquest was undertaken. The sympathies or antipathies of the cities of Cologne, Munster, or Erfurt, for or against such a war, no more affected the policy of the Hohenzollern dynasty,—for which the inhabitants of these countries were forced to sacrifice their blood, their lives and their treasure,—than did the opinions of such places as Gumbinnen or Pasewalk. All of them must have had, be it willingly or unwillingly, only one object before their eyes:—the *nudi obsequii gloria*.

That is the object of human existence in the Prussian State. “Ye vagabonds, do you intend to live for ever?” said once in anger, the Prussian King Frederick II., to his retreating grenadiers. And who, after all has conquered at Königgrätz?

The case is about the same as it was with the first victory of Frederick II. at Molwitz. The Austrians were defeated then; so they were at Königgrätz. That cannot be denied. But at Königgrätz as well as at Molwitz, there were also beaten and conquered the human rights of every single man that belongs to the Hohenzollern State, the right to refuse to be led to the slaughtering field in the service of the Moloch of Hohenzollern rapacity. Conquered and beaten were also at Königgrätz all ideas and sentiments of a liberal tendency in the interior of the Hohenzollern State; conquered and beaten were even beyond the frontiers of that Military State the confidence of the peoples in regard to the security of peace, and the protection of their rights, whenever a stronger power

should feel inclined to attack them and trample them under foot.

It was not the will of the people ; let it be viewed in whatever direction it may, it was not a cause of any kind for which the human mind could feel sympathy or enthusiasm, that had triumphed at Königgrätz ;—it was the dynasty of the Hohenzollerns and their principle—that of absolute Military Monarchy, with its attendant consequences of complete slavery at home, and avidity for conquest abroad.

This energy has quickly borne fruit. First abroad. It has swallowed up countries, to which even according to the right of conquest of former barbarous times, it had not the shadow of a claim. It refused to conclude a treaty of peace with the Princes and with the subjects ; it exiled the former and enslaved the latter. It acknowledged no other limit to its violent annexations than fear of its own safety, or, as Count Bismarck in his Parliament, in order to defend the retreat of the Prussians from the *German* territory of *Luxemburg*, has said with exquisite, though perhaps unwilling irony :*—“ It was only a tribute of justice paid to the Prussian policy, when it was said in a prominent place : that the Prussian policy endeavours to sooth the susceptibilities of the French nation, of course only as far as consistent with its own honour.”

She has further forced the smaller States, north of the Main, to conclude, what may be considered a satire of every true Federal Alliance, the so-called North-Bund, accord-

* Stenographic Reports of the North German Confederation, page 459.

ing to the regulations of which, these countries are allowed to keep meanwhile their Princes as Prussian Civil Governors, as it were, being, however, at the same time in duty bound to assist the Hohenzollern dynasty in their future plans of conquest with their blood.

Not less quickly was the fruit gathered in the interior.

The war was undertaken by Prussia against the will of the Diet, which had refused the necessary supplies. It was undertaken by treason, by violating her Federal ties, and by breaking and rending asunder the former German Bund. Her victory has been most injurious to Germany; it has divided her, torn her to pieces, exposed her frontiers, has surrendered to the new kingdom of Italy, (which has always preached death to the Germans,) its southern bulwark, the conservation of which but a few years previously was considered necessary for the security of Germany in their official report by the General Staff of the Prussian army.

But it was a victory; not only over Austria, but at the same time over all rights of humanity,—and before that idol success, the “Representatives of the People” knelt down in the dust in adoration, to show to the world that the servility from below duly corresponded to the absolutism from above, and that the judgment, which *Lessing* had pronounced on the State of the Hohenzollerns one hundred years ago, is, on account of the skillful art of training of the dynasty, as true now as it was then.

The Berlin Diet surrendered of its own free will the Castle which it had defended till then, if not by arms, at least with words. The Parliament of the North-German Confederation

went much farther still. It voted for the terrible service of the Moloch of the Hohenzollern dynasty, for a number of years in advance, all the victims to the bloody altar, which they might require according to their estimation.

Parliamentary history shows human nature in very few countries in a favourable light; but neither in the Long Parliament of England, nor in the French Convention, can there be found a parallel instance of servility of such an extraordinary character. Count Bismarck was right in saying, that with a Parliament like this, masking the absolute *régime*, it is far easier to govern than with an avowed despotism.

Here lies the nut in the shell. After having surrendered every thing, and in idolatrous adoration of the victory of despotism over the human rights of individuals in particular, and the society at large, sacrificed to violence, not only the rights of the German nation of the present generation, (of that part at least which is under the rule of the Hohenzollern dynasty), but also the rights of generations in future, and thereby still firmer cemented the military absolutism than ever—is it after all this supposed that Prussian absolutism will be absorbed by the German element? Does any one after all this entertain any hopes of the possibility of a liberal development? And by what means? Perhaps through parliamentary speeches?

Such an illusion is like the childish attempt of the Hindoo people to tame the tiger with conjuring formulas.

And who are they that after all this, still entertain a belief in such silly ideas? who in compensation for the loss of all true human liberty, allow themselves to be intoxicated with

the phrases, that "Prussia will be absorbed by Germany," and that "Unity leads to Liberty"?

It is not the German people.

It is an injustice and an untruth to say, that there lives in the German nation, an irresistible impulse towards *Unity*. There exists on the contrary in Germany a strong and vivid sentiment that all the members form one family, and the wish to see them united by a common defensive system against the foreigner, and by common institutions of civilization and progress in the interior. Yet all this, not otherwise than on the primary condition of independence of the several German populations.

As long as Germany exists it has never been one centralized State. During the very time of her power and greatness, under the Saxon and Salic Emperors, and also in the beginning of the reign of the Hohenstaufen family, the separation of the different tribes was more developed and exclusive than ever before or afterwards. The Empire was a Federation of the different national Duchies, each of them forming a separate State, with a King at their head who as King of Germany had an acknowledged right to the Roman Imperial Crown. The people, as such, do not know this history so profoundly, but it lives in their blood. One may know the history of his forefathers and be able to expound it or not, each single man is still the produce of the past, and is connected with it as the fruit is with the root of the tree. The individual may by a decided effort of his will separate himself partly or entirely from it, and even turn in a hostile way against the feelings of the community:—but the totality cannot do it. They follow

the road, which is prescribed to them by their national talents and their history.

The ways of the German nation have never led them the road of the so-called Unity. The very idea is foreign to them. It attaches to nothing tangible or solid, to no historical reminiscence, however traditional or obscure it may be, to no configuration of the German soil, nor to a political or historical preponderance of any capital town, not even to an intellectual preponderance of any of the tribes or countries. The German people, taken in their proper and true sense, have, in spite of their want of historical knowledge, through their common sound sense, a far keener appreciation of the said German Unity than the best intentioned National Liberals. This Unity is only made intelligible and tangible to the people through Prussianism, which wants to begin by subjugating, *at first, all of us other Germans*; not by Prussia being absorbed by Germany, but by Prussia absorbing Germany; in other words: by Prussianising Germany.

We repeat it with emphasis:—the real German people, the country people, from the North Sea to the Alps, know nothing of the theory that the German nationality requires a single and United State. They were happy with their separate existence, and their peculiarities. They were, in spite of many special evils, throughout, quite satisfied with their government. For, with the exception of Austria, there was not a German country, which was behind-hand with the State of the Hohenzollerns, neither in well regulated administration, nor in the righteousness and consciousness of the distribution of justice, in the care for schools, nor in any of the real benefits

of life in general ; on the contrary, there were many of the States, for instance the kingdom of Hanover, which, in all these respects, were in advance of the State of the Hohenzollerns ; the burden of the taxes and the imposts for military purposes were less burdensome, and the system of centralisation less developed and felt. The old German principle of self-government in the Communes was everywhere better preserved, and liberty of conscience and religious freedom far greater than in Prussia.

We must be allowed a few words in explanation of this last sentence.

In all the other States, the governments have since two hundred years renounced the mischievous theory, dating from the Reformation, that the ruler of the country is the chief arbiter of the religion of the inhabitants (*cujus regio, ejus religio*). The Hohenzollerns alone have, down to our own time, in application of their principle of uniformity, and for the development of the same, made use of that theory like a rich booty, although they have in practice employed milder forms. The "*Evangelical Union*," which in itself has neither flesh nor bone, and has nothing positive in an ecclesiastical or dogmatic sense, and which, on the contrary, is essentially a negation of religious positivism ;—this eminently Prussian State-Religion, is the work of the Prussian Kings, and has been forced upon the Lutheran communion, at one time by force, at another by stratagem.

Is there a German Catholic who really believes that, because the Hohenzollern policy has at one time abstained with well calculated prudence from interfering with his right of con-

science, he can always rely with safety that they will do the same in future, and that his religion will be safe and protected? Other German governments will sometimes, as we have seen in our days, momentarily act *unjustly* towards Catholicism; but they can never be so *inimically disposed to it in principle*, as every power must be, which aims at a separate State-religion. The Hohenzollern State is therein more circumspect than Russia, because circumstances compel it to act with greater reserve. But the consequences of the principle of the Hohenzollerns who have acquired the country of Prussia proper through felony and sacrilege, tend necessarily and inevitably towards the establishment of *Cæsaropapismus*, the absolute subordination of the Church, of ecclesiastical life, to the State and its organs, and therefore the favouring of all the means tending to the accomplishment of that object. If this tendency is less perceptible (on account of the precaution taken to hide it), with reference to the Catholic Church as such, it shows itself more in the province closely related to it—the School. In no country of Europe has the State monopoly of public instruction been so extensively employed and made use of, for bringing about a spiritual and intellectual uniformity, than in the State of Hohenzollern. This State monopoly of instruction is quite incompatible with the principle of free instruction, which the Catholic religion is, more than any other corporation, obliged to defend. The monopoly of instruction which no other State has understood so well to appropriate as that of the Hohenzollerns, is one of the most important levers of its political life, one of the most effective means of propagating absolutism on the one part, and servility on the other.

We repeat it :—Neither in material well-being, nor as regards the progress of moral and intellectual culture, was or is any other German country behind that of the Hohenzollerns; on the contrary, in many respects, some of them, are far more advanced.

The supposition that the truly German people will spontaneously sacrifice these true and great blessings, which each single man here enjoys but the subjects of the Hohenzollern dynasty, in exchange for the chimerical project of the so-called German,—meaning Prussian,—Unity, is against human nature.

These good people are told that it is a great advantage to belong to a great State—of course to that great power, Prussia! The honour and benefit is in the eyes of the present generation exactly worth as much as in the eyes of their fathers was the glory to belong to the *grande nation* of Napoleon I.

And still we do not take into consideration the faith and honesty which these good people have for their legitimate governments.

We may be answered that, in spite of all this, the idea of German Unity found advocates and partisans in the Diets of the German Middle States.

This is very true, and still more may be asserted. It cannot be contested, that in Hanover, even the majority of the Lower House under the leadership of von Beningsen, responded entirely to the views of Count Bismarck.

But from the moment of the declaration of war by Prussia, the whole of Germany and of Europe found out that, this

same Hanoverian people, which that House pretended to represent, could stand comparison as to their loyalty and devotion to their dynasty, and therefore to their own right symbolized by it, with any other nation. In Electoral Hesse as well as in Nassau, it is essentially the same. The Houses of Representatives of these States have, therefore, never been the true expression of the real sentiments of the people.

We will not enquire here how far the defective electoral laws have been the cause of it, and how an Assembly, the majority of which, in a moral sense, acted continually only as traitors to their country, could have the appearance of being the defenders of popular rights. We state and accept the facts here just as they are.

On the other side we find in a moral as well as in an intellectual point of view, a sad perversion in a great number of the Germans, and in the very part of the nation which claim superior intellectual culture ; from that part of the nation, which consider themselves the so-styled well educated middle classes, these Chambers had been chiefly formed, and not from the ranks of the *people*. For those classes of the population, the predominant German literature (predominant at least as regards quantity) has been written under the inspiration of Prussia.

In spite, namely, of the flood of books treating of German history, the true knowledge of it is but very insignificant. The opinion, which in reality has been proved erroneous by all historical experience, that a nation, in order to obtain a higher state of intellectual development and culture, must first be massed into *one* State, took also root in Germany after the just

hopes of the people had been disappointed in 1815. It is very remarkable, that just a great part of the German students, who have had, in the study of the intellectual development of the ancient Greeks, and that of their own country, the best proof of the contrary, have the most easily been led into that error. The Prussian memoir of 1822, lately so often mentioned, elucidating the course of the Prussian policy, as directed towards the future dissolution of the Germanic Confederation, and the expulsion of Austria from it, has already at that time fully pointed out the importance of that error of the possibility of its being turned to good account for the benefit of the State of the Hohenzollerns.

According to this, the Prussian policy has since that time promulgated by speech and writings, the opinion, through its organs, that the State of the Hohenzollerns, which in effect has originated and grown up in opposition to Germany, and through its dismemberment, represented Germany.

The fruits thereof could be already seen at that melancholy comedy, the choice of an Emperor by the Professors-Electors in Frankfort. These simpletons (whose stupendous knowledge in details, we, by the bye, do not doubt) have at the same time proved, through the sentimentality of their good will, their utter ignorance of all historical progress and the solidarity which unites all the members of a Confederation like the concatenation of the last link of a chain with the first:—how could they be so simple as to imagine that a Prussian King would ever exchange his title, in which the principle of the Hohenzollern State is hidden, for that of an Emperor of Germany! The case is quite different. Germany is the next

object for conquest of the Hohenzollern dynasty. The foundation of the same rests on the principle, which they have themselves implanted and which they never will nor can change.

Clear as this fact was already at that time, the party which is incapable of learning, has since then still increased. After the Austrian misfortune in 1859, it appeared as a close body in the *Nationalverein*, already then with the pronounced intention of excluding Austria from Germany, and thus to form a united Germany under the sceptre of the Hohenzollerns. Prussian policy was enabled to use these pliant tools at will, because they were very useful at the time of preparation for decisive action and very little dangerous afterwards.

We here not only speak of those who in their own native country, in Hanover, in Electoral Hesse, in Nassau, whenever the rightful government was guilty only of the shadow of a partiality, rose in what they called their moral anger to the fury of a lion, and who now with the most servile adulation bring to the tyrant everything, that he may order, from the rights and property of their till then independent native land—not only those individuals we mean, but the entire race of those political minors, who yet expect, from one day to another, to have been more than the simple foot-stools of Hohenzollern grandeur.

The whole of that party with their dependents and followers have filled Germany and Europe with the cry for German Unity, which cry, however,—it cannot be too often repeated—has found no echo in the hearts of the true German people. That party spoke in the Chambers of the Diets, they

taught from the chairs in the universities, gave their oracles in the newspapers, travelled about, and held meetings. It was often one and the same person who did all this. The ancient method of frightening the adversary by the force of the war cry, has been applied again with great success by the *Nationalverein*.

Nor do we deny that Count Bismarck has made use of that party with astonishing skill. It was the policy of the Hohenzollerns, before that most unjust of all wars, to adopt the whole phraseology of that party, and to found thereby, when success smiled upon them, through this very fact, absolution of their sins and misdeeds from the leaders of that party. But not so from the real people;—the voices of that people were not heard.

It would be as unjust to accuse the German people that they willingly submitted to the tyranny imposed upon them by means of an unexpected and undreamt of series of successes of the Prussian army, and that they voluntarily now joined in the mendacious cry of the so-called German Unity, under the dynasty of Hohenzollern, as it would be indefensible to suppose that this dynasty would regard or accept the pretended Unity of Germany as the limit of its lust of conquest.

The Hohenzollern dynasty has made use of the really existing efforts of the German nationality tending towards a closer political unity and social intercourse, towards a strengthening of the Federative ties, in order to corrupt or convert by means of its organs these efforts by the fallacious cry for a United German State. It has done this in order to use the idea as a means for

its designs of aggrandizement and of conquest. But this aim is entirely different from the tendency of the German people. It is inherent in the nature of the dynasty, and is essential to its existence, without which it neither can nor will exist. The last century was not as yet acquainted with the new idea of our modern time, that German nationality requires the creation of one compact State. But the tendency of the Hohenzollern dynasty for conquest did exist. It attached itself to no nationality in particular. King Frederick II. seized and annexed whatever countries of German or Slavonian nationality he could obtain. Nay, he went even further than this. Whatever lands and nationalities he obtained by force and fraud of every sort, and incorporated in his military Unity-State, whether they were Germans, Slavonians, Silesians, East-Frisians, Poles, or inhabitants of the Rhine—he called them all “*La nation Prussienne*.”

The truth or falsehood of the present German Unity State is accurately the same in every point as that *nation Prussienne* of Frederick II. The conduct of the dynasty is to day what it then was. The only limit to the Hohenzollern tendency for conquest is *fear*. Whenever the principle of nationality, which they pretend to defend, touches that limit, it falls to the ground.

The Luxemburg affair is not of ancient date; yet it forms only a solitary instance of the pusillanimity of the Hohenzollern dynasty. But in the East, on the Borders of Russia, and opposed to the power of the Czar, the cowardice of the dynasty of the Hohenzollerns remains a constant fact. It neither dares to protest against the occasional ill-treatment of some of its sub-

jects, nor against the locking up of the Russian frontiers, which deprives entire provinces of the means of subsistence, and still less does it dare to speak a single word in favour of the German subjects under the Russian dominion in the Baltic provinces, who are continually persecuted by Russian misrule and torture.

The reason of such a proceeding of this upstarting but, it is to be hoped, only temporarily Great Power, has been characterized by King Frederick II., the prototype of the dynasty and its policy, in a similar case, with these words:—“I feel my humiliation, and recognise that a grass-blade must not complain, when a branch of an oak tree crushes it.”

The servility of the Hohenzollern dynasty towards Russia is the same to day as it was then. It alone will prove the falsehood, that the Hohenzollern State defends the German nationality. We repeat it:—The dynasty of the Hohenzollerns uses in the mean time the idea of German nationality as a pretext, in order to captivate the nation and make it subservient to its purposes. Its tendency towards conquest, however, goes far beyond it,—it is without limit.

This state of affairs the Empress, Maria Theresia, has described with the following words:—“We shall be run over and laid in the dust, one after another, if we do not firmly unite together.”

No fresh addition of German or foreign subjects is able to weaken or change the Hohenzollern system. They only increase the servile power;—the governing power remains the

* Œuvres de Frédéric-le-Grand, tome XXVI, page 501.

same. The energy of the latter is far stronger than any possible passive power of resistance. It has forced into submission every such addition; and pressed all its newly acquired populations into the service of the policy of Berlin. It is not the death of a single man, who may represent that policy, but the annihilation of that system, and its being rendered for ever innocuous, which can save our German character and the human civilisation from the dangers, which the union of violence and falsehood of the system of the Hohenzollern dynasty is preparing for them.

The destruction of this system is in the interest not only of human civilization, but also and above all in that of the Germans and the French, for the sake of their own self-preservation and security; because it is inimical alike to the peaceable existence of the neighbouring countries and peoples, and their intellectual development and material well-being, as well as opposed to all proper sense of justice, since it recognises no other right than that of the stronger.

The treaty of Prague has set the river Maine a limit as to the extension of that system in the South. But all treaties which are opposed to the growth and extension of the Hohenzollern dynasty, are only so long respected by the same as the fear of losses, outbalances the price of breaking them.

Nor is it always necessary openly to break a treaty,—it may also be evaded. The offensive and defensive Treaties of Alliance which, in August, 1866, were forced upon the governments of South Germany, that were unarmed by their own fault, and which by their terms make the King of Prussia

master of the armed forces of South Germany, are contrary to the treaty of Prague, which stipulates the international independence of these States.

It is probable that the Prussian policy would willingly avoid a war, the object of which would be, the annexation of the South German States, or the forcing them into the North German Confederation. They hope to exert a pressure, through the various means at their command; through the so-called Customs-Parliament, and all the numerous tools which they are able to put in motion in South Germany; through the weakness and impotence of many others, (whose duty it would be energetically to resist,) and thus to bring the fruit to maturity without resorting to open warfare.

But let us consider whether the position of France can allow that country to suffer such encroachments in the long run. We do not speak of the personal views of the Emperor of the French or of his policy, we only try to find out what a great nation, which prides itself on its position in the world, must feel at the idea, that on its eastern frontier a Military State of an offensive character, by its nature and history, extends itself farther and farther.

We shall not be answered, we hope, as is the habit of the Berlin newspapers to do, that the progress of affairs on the other side of the Rhine is not any more the business of France now than it was in the time of the Germanic Confederation. It cannot be a matter of indifference to one neighbour, whether the other has dangerously inflammable materials collected in his house. France knows but too

well the enormous difference between the defensive character of the former Confederation,—which from that very reason, as answering to the real nature of the German nation, was a guarantee of the European peace,—and the offensive character of the Hohenzollern dynasty with the fictitious name of a North German Confederation, which places all the military forces to the North of the river Maine at the unconditional disposal of that dynasty.

France has in former times as well as in the present greatly sinned against the Germans. It was, considering her own interest, a great political blunder of that power, when 130 years ago, in opposition to her obligations towards Austria, which was never an offensive power, she gave assistance to the aggressive dynasty of the Hohenzollerns against the former for the purpose of robbing her of Silesia.

In recognition of this blunder France concluded with Austria, in the year 1756, a defensive alliance. The then Chancellor of the Austrian Empire, Kaunitz, emphatically asserted, that there were two powers of second or third-rate rank, with an insatiable desire for aggrandizement, and which tried to satisfy that longing by exciting rivalry between Austria and France, namely—Piedmont in Italy, and Prussia in Germany.

Another grave political blunder of France was that, in spite of the said alliance, she refused to her Austrian ally every assistance against the Russo-Prussian plan of dividing Poland, and therefore placed Austria in such a position as to be obliged to take part in that unfortunate affair.

It was finally a grave political error that France, in 1866,

did not place herself betimes in such a state as to be able to force Prussia to narrow considerably her plan, of extending her frontiers after her victory, of which she took such disproportionate advantage. The retirement of the French troops from the eastern frontier gave to the dynasty of the Hohenzollerns actually the means to act as it did; and yet the independence of the German Middle States was not only necessary for the interests of the whole German nation and its intellectual and national advancement in general, it was also required on grounds of the sanctity of international right, and for the preservation of the peace of Europe:—it was above all especially of advantage to the interests and security of France.

It has happened otherwise. But will France, after having once committed that blunder, for her own sake be able to allow the dynasty of the Hohenzollerns to continue to profit by it? Can France, from the point of view of her own safety, quietly look on and see that power which, by its origin and growth, can be nothing else than an *aggressive* one, become daily stronger and extend its frontiers? Can we say, that France will permit it to advance still further, until one day, when Prussia feels herself the strongest of the two, she may carry on a war against France as she did, in 1866, against Germany and Austria?

“We shall be overrun and knocked to the ground, one after another;”—thus admonished the Empress, Maria Theresia, ninety years ago, her daughter, the Queen of France,—“if we do not in a firm alliance, and in proper time, oppose this power, which is always ready for attack.”

The hour of an alliance, in the sense of Maria Theresia, has already passed; Austria, having been left to herself, is beaten.

France falls now back upon the defensive. We say advisedly, the *defensive*, for against an aggressive Military Power like that of the Hohenzollerns, for which right and treaties exist only so long as it is held in awe, every war is only one of self-defence, just as is the combat of man in a wilderness against the attacks of the beasts of prey.

Such will be the war, chiefly through the reason that the present state of affairs is incompatible with the principal conditions of a peaceful development of the welfare and prosperity of the peoples. It cannot be repeated too often, that just as the fearful system of using up all human forces, in men and money, for military purposes, originated, 150 years ago, with the dynasty of the Hohenzollerns, so it has been at first, and is at present, chiefly supported by it. The other powers follow the example, because the duty of self-preservation forces them to do so. The curse of the nations falls, not upon their own governments, which cannot do otherwise, but upon the dynasty of the Hohenzollerns as the author of the evil—in France no less than in Germany. For the Northern Confederation, armed to the teeth, forces France, being always threatened, to do the same; it compels the French as well as the Germans to sacrifice the vital forces of the people to an armed peace;—to a peace which will only last so long till the Hohenzollern dynasty, true to its system, considers the opportune moment come for taking the chance of a tiger's leap.

But will France wait, until the Hohenzollern dynasty has

succeeded in annexing Southern Germany as well, and until in unison with Russia it begins to break also the Austrian Empire to pieces and divide its ruins? Then indeed comes inevitably war to the knife, only with the difference, that the chances of success will be infinitely less favourable for France. It is no use to conceal what way affairs may turn; France, be it willingly or unwillingly, sooner or later, cannot avoid the *combat à l'outrance* with the dynasty of the Hohenzollerns and their State.

In that war France will have for allies, all those Germans who consider the principle of the Hohenzollern dynasty,—the principle of violence and falsity,—as the Arch-enemy of everything that is German. Both France and we have an interest in common to drive the Hohenzollern dynasty back to the other side (the right shore) of the Elbe, to place it again in such a state, that it can be no longer considered dangerous for the peace of Europe and the quiet development of the welfare of the peoples.

But here we expect to hear the voices of those who will exclaim, that an alliance of a German power with France against Germany is treason against the fatherland.

We should also join in this exclamation, if these words were true. But there can be no treason against Germany, because Germany no longer exists. No foreign alliance could be made, so long as Germany was united by the Confederacy, without treason being committed against her. Such treason was committed by Prussia, and in addition to it, the long planned destruction of the Confederation was achieved by her. Through treachery she has gained the victory, in consequence

of her alliance with Italy, by compelling part of the Austro-German forces to oppose the Italians ; for, let the military power of the Italians be what it may, the Austrians engaged at Custozza would have more than sufficed to turn the wavering scale at Königgrätz, on the 3rd of July, 1866, in favour of the righteous cause. The Hohenzollern State owes its success at that time to its treason against Germany.

This Prussian alliance with Italy was in every way treason against Germany,—even if we leave out of account all the lawfully existing treaties,—and for this reason : that in the year 1859, the competent Prussian authorities pronounced themselves to the effect, that the passing of the Mincio line by a French-Piedmontese army would infringe the safety of Germany. But just because this Prussian treason against Germany has been successful, in consequence whereof the Hohenzollern dynasty has dismembered Germany, there can be at the present time no treason, neither morally nor by the law of nations, committed against Germany, by the alliance of any German with foreign powers.

As regards an alliance with France, it would be impossible to commit the national interests of Germany in such a degree, as the Hohenzollern State has done by sacrificing to Italy the Southern frontiers of Germany ; *for France neither would nor could carry on a war against German nationality, or for the expansion of her own frontier eastward.* No German State possesses a foot of ground which France would like to appropriate on account of the nationality of its inhabitants, or which she would retain in her power for any length of time, should she succeed in appropriating it momentarily ; even if there were in

France a small party which believed, that the equilibrium, destroyed by the State of the Hohenzollerns, can be restored by an extension of the French frontiers towards the east, such a party cannot be numerous, for this view is in contradiction to the notorious state of affairs. The question is not one of a few hundred square miles, but one of *principles*. The question is, to put an end to the godless principle of the Hohenzollern dynasty,—that curse of the peoples of Europe,—which recognises upon earth no other right than the might of the strongest. France only can do that;—the French nation is the only one which can rise as the protector and defender of right upon earth, first for itself, and then also for the other nations.

Therefore, every desire on the part of the French for the acquisition of a German country, would be a desertion—and a very foolish desertion—of the principles which the French nation professes. It would change the war of France with the dynasty of the Hohenzollerns, in whatever way it may originate, from a *defensive* one (which it would be, if undertaken on the part of France, with an acknowledged abandonment of all pretention to an acquisition of territory, only to prevent the further growth of the Hohenzollern principle,) into an *offensive* one. France would thereby, in the eyes of the Germans, place the Hohenzollern dynasty in the right, and would thus put into its hands the very weapon which it most desires. It would give that dynasty the right to call upon all Germans to fight against the common enemy.

And just because the Hohenzollern dynasty most desires to get hold of that weapon against France, as it would give it the moral power which it does not possess in itself,—

therefore it may be assumed almost with certainty, that France will not even leave to it the semblance of that weapon, which the Prussian dynasty falsely pretends to possess, but will openly and solemnly declare, that she does not make war against the German nationality, that she does not wish to make an acquisition of territory for herself, but that she makes war in the interest of her own peace, and that of Europe, that she makes war against the lawless principles of the Hohenzollern State, which despises all existing rights, so that the German nation, by its annihilation, may reconstruct itself anew, on the basis of the principle of Federalism.

That, and that alone is the basis upon which innumerable Germans will join France as their deliverer.

— For they have the right to do so not only morally, but also by the law of nations.

There exists at present,—as the Prussian semi-official newspapers rather prematurely proclaimed, as early as June 1866, immediately after the destruction of the German Bund by Prussia,—no longer a Germany in a political sense, but only a middle-European group of States, the inhabitants of which speak German.

Now, although through the treason and violence of the Hohenzollern dynasty, the bonds that held the great fatherland together, have been for the time broken, there still remain the duties towards the smaller and properly native country inviolably in force.

Here it is necessary and important in reference to the question of right, to hear Count Bismarck's own words.

This gentleman commenced, on the 1st of April, 1867, in

the so-called Diet of the North German Confederation, the exposition of his opinions in regard to the Luxemburg affair with the following words* :—

“At the dissolution and through the dissolution of the former German Confederacy, each of the States, which took part therein, regained its full sovereignty, just as they possessed it before its formation, but which they had voluntarily limited by the obligations they had contracted in entering the Bund.”

“After the dissolution of the Bund, the Grand-Duchy of Luxemburg and its Grand-Duke enjoyed the same sovereign characters as did the kingdom of the Netherlands and its King. The great majority of the former members of the Bund, as well as Prussia, made use of *their liberty* to form immediately upon a national foundation a new League, &c.”

These are the legal views of Count Bismarck. We adopt them so far,—but with the proviso, that not through the Prussian desertion of the Bund, on June the 14th, 1866, the re-establishment of the original sovereignty of a European character took place,—but only in consequence of Austria leaving the Bund by virtue of the treaty of peace of Prague. Since that time, the right of a German Sovereign to enter into peace or war treaties is, according to the law of nations, subject to no limitation whatever.

Let us now consider the case in its single points.

The King of Prussia, immediately after his rupture with the Bund, made war upon a number of German Princes, who had equal rights with himself; he exiled them, (and although the King of Hanover even then, was so far master of his

* Stenographic Reports, page 489.

feelings as to offer him the palm of peace, he rejected it,) and took possession of their countries by a supposed right of conquest. There exists no precedent, which can form a basis according to the law of nations, of such a state of affairs. There has been made a separate treaty, as regards the fortune of the Royal Hanoverian House, (since private property can never form the object of a supposed conquest,) which treaty repudiates in distinct terms, the recognition of the right of Prussia to the possession of Hanover. The relation of Prussia towards the other deposed Princes is a similar one.

The King of Prussia himself designated this relation, in Mai, 1867, in a letter to the Queen Maria of Hanover, with these words:—"We are still in a state of war." If we join these arguments, it results therefrom, according to the expression of Count Bismarck, and the King of Prussia, that even from the Prussian point of view, the dethroned Princes are to be considered as European Sovereigns who, according to the law of nations, are still in a state of war with Prussia, and perfectly free in the choice of their alliances for purposes of peace or war.

What is true of the Sovereigns, is also true of their subjects. They have not entered the servitude of the despotic Crown of Prussia by virtue of a treaty, which could form a basis, according to the law of nations, but they have been *forced* into it. They have towards it no other obligation than such as is imposed by mere force. The duty ceases as soon as the pressure of the extraneous force ceases to exist.

We speak here of the case from the point of view according to the law of nations, and not according to human

feelings. If these were consulted, the case would be quite different. Whoever does expect, that a native of Schleswig-Holstein, of Hanover, of Electoral Hesse, of Nassau, or of Frankfort, who is free from Prussian fetters, can wish and try for anything else than for the liberation and salvation of his country from the brutal and at the same time hypocritical and tyrannical yoke of Prussia, or that he could have a more ardent desire than to see the ruin and dissolution of the Hohenzollern State,—that curse of his homestead, and of the German fatherland?

In these endeavours and efforts, no one will allow himself to be led astray by the pretence, that the Hohenzollern State signifies or represents the fatherland of the Germans. Their own experience keeps it still vividly in their memories, that they have been made war upon, by the Hohenzollern State, that they are cruelly oppressed, because they have, as it becomes Germans, been faithful and true to their rights and governments. They know that they are destined henceforth to sacrifice the blood of their children, only that this Hohenzollern dynasty may bring upon other nations the same calamities which it prepared for them. They do not deny that the Germans who are under the sway of the Hohenzollern dynasty stand nearer to them than the French nation. But the brother, who first raises his felonious hand against his brother, ought to be admonished by the voice of his kindred blood to let drop his hand;—but the malefactor has no right to ask from his victim upon the score of consanguinity that he should submit patiently to be beaten and not accept any help wherever it be offered to him.

A number of governments of other States have joined the Prussian North German Bund. "They made use," said Count Bismarck, "of their *liberty*, like Prussia, to form a Confederacy on a national basis." No doubt some of the governments may have merited this rude irony, but the people have by no means deserved the moral and material injury to which they have been subjected. They were compelled to submit to the power of superior force; but by far the greater number harbour in their hearts the sincere and fervent wish to see that terribly oppressive power collapse.

The South German States have been placed in a similar position by the treaties of August 1866. All depends on what position they will take in the hour of trial.

If we judge rightly they will all take the conduct of Prussia in 1813 as an example.

The Hohenzollern dynasty concluded the treaty of peace of Tilsit in the year 1807. In the year 1812 it concluded the alliance with France against Russia. It supplied an army of twenty thousand men. When the unexpected blows of misfortune fell, in rapid succession, upon the French army, in Russia, there rose in the people's breast the ardent wish for delivery. The Hohenzollern dynasty refused its consent, because it feared rather than it hoped. The People rose all the same. The Russians approached. Then only, confident of succour, the Hohenzollern dynasty broke the treaty of alliance with France, and made forthwith the treaty with Russia for a war of conquest, to the detriment of its German brethren and neighbours.

The Hohenzollern dynasty cannot expect that the example

of those days, which it generally considers as the most glorious of its history, will be entirely lost to the other States. The great difference, no doubt, is that the Prusso-French treaty of alliance of 1812, was concluded months before the breaking out of the war, and, therefore, with considerably more freedom on the part of the Hohenzollern State, than was the case in the year 1866, with the August treaties forced upon the South German States during the war, and that at a time, when, so to say, the knife was at their throat. But we allow this advantage to the Hohenzollerns, and will only point to another fact, namely, that immediately after the first shock which the Hohenzollern State will suffer, if not the Southern governments, at least the South German people, will break the fragile bonds of the alliance with the Hohenzollern dynasty.

And Austria?—We believe that we can and ought to suppose that in Austria the words of the illustrious lady, who has founded, as it were, that State in its present political and international form, the words of the Empress, Maria Theresa, are not yet forgotten. The Hohenzollern dynasty has grown great by treason towards Austria, and at the expense of Austria; it will and cannot abandon that path. Austria is, for Prussia and Russia,—which two powers the Empress, Maria Theresa, has considered as but *one*—the chief obstacle to their offensive plans. Austria will know from the words of the Empress, Maria Theresa, what she has to expect from the fresh hypocritical professions of friendship of the Hohenzollern dynasty. She will also know by the same words, what she has to believe of the mendacious assertion, that the State of the

Hohenzollerns and Russia will separate,—as if the Hohenzollern State could ever cease to be the submissive handmaiden of Russia.* On the part of Austria, however, a true and faithful alliance with Prussia could be possible; but such is not the case on the part of Prussia. The State of the Hohenzollerns can only acknowledge, according to its principle, as its true and last aim, the destruction of Austria and the acquisition of her component parts as far as possible. The success of a fresh attack is only another stage on that road.

Austria harbours no ideas of vengeance, she respects the treaties; she has, after her great misfortune, concluded the treaty of peace of Prague. She will keep it. She has never yet waged an offensive war against Prussia, nor will she in future do so.

Still there are complications in the political life of States and peoples, which sometimes compel even the most peaceful to take the sword in hand; and such a complication will happen to Austria, with or against her will.

Previous to the rupture of the Bund in 1866, there was for Austria, as well as for the other German States, no choice in case of a conflict of Prussia with France. Austria would have taken the side of Prussia, which was a part of Germany, with all her forces; but henceforth, according to treaties, she has only to consult her own interest and self-preservation. We

* Nothing can prove clearer the subserviency of Prussian diplomacy to Russia, than the now chronic famines in Eastern Prussia, on account of Russia's locking up, so to say, hermetically, her western frontier, thus preventing import and export, and every sort of commerce. Prussia could soon change this state of things, by simply leaving off playing the part of police in that locality for Russia.

can have no doubt, remembering the words of Maria Theresia, to which side her decision will incline.

It is said, that there is in Hungary a party to which it would be indifferent, if the German countries of Austria would also become a prey of Prussia, provided the Crown of St. Stephen were to remain intact.

If there is such a party, it cannot be very numerous or powerful; for it speaks against the history of their forefathers and against the duty of self-preservation, not only of Austria, but even of Hungary itself.

When 120 years ago the Hungarians exclaimed: *Regi nostro Mariæ Theresiæ vitam et sanguinem consecramus*, and made these proud words a reality, they fulfilled, in this ready sacrifice for the Queen of Hungary, (who was not there, but in Silesia, Bohemia and Austria sorely pressed,) only the duty of self-preservation; for the conqueror of Germany would not voluntarily make the Leitha a barrier for his conquest.

When the Swedish King, Gustavus Adolphus, still stood in the centre of Germany, before his foot had yet touched any part of the Hapsburg territory, he asked in Constantinople the permission to place the Crown of St. Stephen on his head. Gustavus Adolphus, however, was in every respect the precursor of the Hohenzollern dynasty, which follows in his footsteps, even where it cannot clearly see the traces.

For Hungary, there is only prosperity and safety under her own mild and just dynasty, in her close union with the whole of Austria. Hungary is not only a desirable acquisition for Prussia, it is still more so for Russia. Serred between the two conquering powers, she could become the apple of discord,

and at the same time, the battlefield, of the rapaciousness of these two powers; but whichever way the chances may turn, Hungary would in any case cease to be Hungary.

Through these reasons it is in the interest of Hungary not less than in the interest of a real Germany, that the dynasty of the Hohenzollerns and their power, should be brought back into such limits, that they can no longer be a constant danger to the maintenance of the general peace of the nations.

CONCLUSION.

WHEN, after all that precedes, the question is openly put to us:—What is it, you desire? we shall answer just as openly:—*War against the State of the Hohenzollerns,—war against that terrible principle, which has created that State, and which continues to animate it!*

We desire this war, without mistaking the disastrous consequences of this wish. It lies certainly clear before our eyes, that this war will above all bring indescribable misery, immediately and next, upon Germany.

And yet we do wish that war, because it is the lesser of the two evils which are menacing us.

The greater of the two evils is, the propagation of the principles of the Hohenzollern dynasty, in the old as well as in the new provinces; the acquisition of fresh countries by its well-known means of violence and deceit, and the infusion of its pernicious system into them,—the necessity of the rest of Europe to imitate them, and then—after all—still war, a war more terrible, more devastating, and more destructive than ever.

We have, as Germans, no objection to unite with France in a war against the Hohenzollern State; for this Hohenzollern

State has torn asunder and dismembered our German fatherland; it has despised and crushed our just feeling of independence (*Sondergefühl*), and our national peculiarities, in order to force us to put on, instead, the Prussian uniform.*

We recognise in the dynasty of the Hohenzollerns, in the principles by which it is swayed and has formed the Prussian State, the enemy of the German nation, the antithesis of of everything that is truly German, and of all peaceful and liberal development;—in one word:—*The dynasty of the Hohenzollerns is partly by its principles in themselves, and partly through its connexion with Russia, the real veritable and hereditary enemy of Germany!*

We have no hesitation to ally ourselves with France against that State of the Hohenzollerns, because the French nation has a similar interest with us for the re-establishment of a German federative system, which, according to its nature, is not of an offensive but necessarily of a defensive character. We have no fear of French projects of conquest, for we are convinced, that France will not mistake her own true interests. The true advantage for France is, that we Germans, who are ill-treated by the Hohenzollern Monarchy, consider welcome a war which France may undertake against that State, and that in

* In former as well as in more modern times, the popular voice in Germany, designated France as the natural enemy of that country; but this was a popular mistake, founded chiefly upon the fact, that, whenever the French army traversed any part of Germany, be it as enemies or friends, the people of the country suffered greatly by it, and thus, taking the effect for the cause, the French were considered the natural enemies of Germany. Another reason, which also greatly contributed to it, was the execution, during the French Revolution, of the Queen of Louis XVI., Marie-Antoinette, a Princess of the Imperial House of Austria.

such a war, we are ready to assist France;—not, however, in a war, the aim and object of which would be, to obtain a part of German territory. For such a war on the part of France would be in the interest of the Hohenzollern State; and further, France herself will understand that even should she obtain a part of the German soil, she could neither assimilate that part nor keep it under her dominion.

With this conviction and at the same time—we repeat it with the strongest emphasis—with this condition, that France will not mistake her own true advantage, that she will make a proper distinction between Germany and the Hohenzollern State, that she will make it her aim to destroy the principles, by which the Hohenzollern State has been founded and grown, and will continue to grow, if allowed to do so, we shall welcome the eagles of France in a similar way as we were once unfortunately obliged to welcome the Russian colours.

The curse of the coming war, which we Germans are obliged to desire as the lesser evil, falls back upon that principle and its representatives, who, with frivolous superciliousness, relying upon their superior strength and omnipotence, which they have acquired through their treachery against Germany, and confiding in the snares which they had laid in advance, as well as in the belief, that we would not give credit to the energy of their deceit, have conjured up the first war, and are exposing us and themselves to the miseries of another still more serious conflict.

such a war, we are ready to make France, the main and object of which would be to obtain a part of her territory. For such a war on the part of France would be in the interest of the Hohenzollern State; and further, France herself will understand that even should she obtain a part of the German soil, she could neither assimilate that part nor keep it under her dominion.

Which is the condition of the same thing—we repeat it with the strongest emphasis—with this condition, that France will not resist for more than a moment, that she will make a permanent distinction between Germany and the Hohenzollern State, that she will refuse to let her aim to destroy the empire, by giving the Hohenzollern State the same freedom and power, and will continue to grow in allowed to do so, we shall welcome the establishment of France in a position as powerful as once and forever obliged to recognize the Russian colonies.

The cause of the coming war, which no German was obliged to desire as the least evil, talks back upon that principle and its representatives, who, with furious superciliousness, relying upon their superior strength and omnipotence, which they have acquired through their treachery against Germany, and confiding in the errors which they had laid in advance, as well as in the belief that we would not give credit to the energy of their deceit, have computed up the first war, and are exposing us and ourselves to the miseries of another still more serious conflict. We are not at all of the opinion that the present war is a necessary one, and we are not at all of the opinion that the present war is a necessary one, and we are not at all of the opinion that the present war is a necessary one.



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